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FISA SECTION 702: DOES QUERYING INCIDENTALLY 
COLLECTED INFORMATION CONSTITUTE A SEARCH 
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT? 
Rachel G. Miller* 
INTRODUCTION 
An inherent source of conflict in the United States exists between protecting 
national security and safeguarding individual civil liberties.  Throughout history, 
Americans have consistently been skeptical and fearful of the government abusing 
its power by spying on Americans.  In an effort to curtail government abuses through 
surveillance, President Carter and Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA).1  The purpose of FISA was to establish a “statutory 
procedure authorizing the use of electronic surveillance in the United States for 
foreign intelligence purposes.”2  FISA provides the government with the authority 
to engage in electronic surveillance, targeted at foreign powers or agents of foreign 
powers, for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information.3  FISA 
initially permitted certain surveillance activities, almost all of which occurred within 
the United States, but excluded the vast majority of overseas foreign intelligence 
surveillance activities.4 
Following 9/11, the government’s interest in surveilling terrorists was at an all-
time high.  However, no authority existed under the current statutory scheme of 
FISA to surveil suspected terrorists and their communications with Americans 
without prior approval from the FISA Court.5  In 2005, President Bush, relying on 
his Commander-in-Chief power and authorization under the Authorization for Use 
of Military Force Act, enacted the Terrorist Surveillance Program allowing the 
 
 * Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2020; Bachelor of Arts in Economics 
and Government, The University of Texas at Austin, 2016.  I would like to thank Professor Jimmy 
Gurulé for his mentorship and advice throughout the writing process.  I would also like to thank 
my family for their constant support, and my friends at Notre Dame Law Review Reflection for their 
sincere edits.  All errors are my own.  
 1 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–85 (2012). 
 2 H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 22 (1978).  
 3 See id. 
 4 H.R. Rep. No. 114-109, pt. 1, at 3 (2015).  
 5 Elizabeth Goitein et al., Lessons from the History of National Security Surveillance, in 
THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE LAW 550 (David Gray & Stephen E. Henderson 
eds., 2017) (“FISA . . . required the government to obtain an order from the FISA Court [each time] 
it wished to obtain wire communications involving Americans.”). 
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National Security Agency (NSA) to conduct surveillance and collect information 
without warrants.6  Under this program, one of the individuals being surveilled had 
to be a suspected terrorist, and one was required to be located outside the United 
States.7  However, the lack of warrants raised many concerns regarding individual 
privacy rights and civil liberties.8  In response, Congress enacted section 702 in July 
2008 as part of the FISA Amendments Act (FAA).9  Section 702 broadened the 
scope of FISA allowing the government to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance 
outside the United States without an individualized application for each target.10  The 
FAA garnered bipartisan support, notably from then-Senator Obama in 2008 and 
more recently former FBI director Christopher Wray, who stated section 702 is “one 
of the most valuable tools that we have in our toolbox to keep America safe.”11  
Additionally, section 702 has proven commendable as a vast number of terrorist 
plots have been foiled through use of information obtained under section 702.12  For 
example, information obtained under section 702 led to the arrest of Najibullah Zazi, 
a U.S. citizen living in the United States, for his role in an al-Qaeda plot to carry out 
suicide attacks on the New York City subway system.13 
However, during the process of collecting information from foreign targets, it 
is evident that collection of U.S. persons’ information—not permitted to be 
intentionally obtained—may still be collected if a U.S. person is in contact with the 
intended foreign target.  Concerns regarding incidental collection of U.S. persons’ 
communications under section 702 surveillance began to grow.14  Critics argued that 
collection of U.S. persons’ communications violated the Fourth Amendment 
 
 6 See Gary L. Gregg II, George W. Bush: Foreign Affairs, MILLER CTR., 
https://millercenter.org/president/gwbush/foreign-affairs (last visited Nov. 13, 2018).  
 7 Id. 
 8 See Goitein, supra note 5, at 550–51. 
 9 FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008) (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012)).  
 10 See Jessica Zuckerman, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act of 2008, 
HERITAGE FOUND. (Nov. 13, 2012), https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/foreign-intelligence-
surveillance-amendments-act-2008#_ftn1. 
 11 Jack Goldsmith & Susan Hennessey, The Merits of Supporting 702 Reauthorization 
(Despite Worries About Trump and the Rule of Law), LAWFARE (Jan. 18, 2018), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/merits-supporting-702-reauthorization-despite-worries-about-
trump-and-rule-law. 
 12 See “Section 702” Saves Lives, Protects the Nation and Allies, NAT’L SECURITY AGENCY 
& CENT. SECURITY SERV. (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.nsa.gov/News-Features/News-
Stories/Article-View/Article/1627009/section-702-saves-lives-protects-the-nation-and-allies/ 
(discussing various ways Section 702 collection has helped thwart terrorist activity). 
 13 See BRUCE HOFFMAN ET AL., 9/11 REVIEW COMM’N, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
THE FBI: PROTECTING THE HOMELAND IN THE 21ST CENTURY 39 (2015); see also Gia Vang, 
Kansas City Man Suspected in New York Terror Plot, FOX4 (June 18, 2013), 
https://fox4kc.com/2013/06/18/kansas-city-man-suspected-in-new-york-terror-plot/ (discussing 
how the NSA used information collected under section 702 to uncover an al-Qaeda cell in Kansas 
City that was in the initial stages of planning an attack on the New York Stock Exchange). 
 14 See Zuckerman, supra note 10. 
2020] F I S A  S E C T I O N  7 0 2  141 
because it was a warrantless search.15  Nevertheless, courts have upheld the 
constitutionality of incidental collection and asserted that the collection is not a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.16  While the concerns regarding incidental 
collection have subsided,17 a new Fourth Amendment challenge has presented itself.  
Information that has lawfully been obtained through section 702 surveillance, 
including information that has been incidentally collected, can later be “queried” or 
searched by intelligence agencies.18  When the government conducts queries, they 
are able to access the contents of 702-acquired information and may be able to use 
the subsequently obtained information as evidence in unrelated criminal 
proceedings.  Importantly, however, section 702 includes many comprehensive 
safeguards protecting the privacy interests of U.S. persons.  Likewise, the Privacy 
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (“PCLOB”)19—a bipartisan oversight agency 
within the executive branch—found that section 702 is subject to extensive oversight 
and further concluded there was “no evidence of intentional abuse.”20 
This Note poses the question of whether subsequent queries conducted on 
incidentally collected section 702 communications constitute searches under the 
Fourth Amendment and therefore require a warrant.  Part I discusses traditional 
FISA and provides background on protections that have been implemented to assure 
individual liberties.  Part II discusses the FISA amendments and the specifics of 
section 702, including the newly implemented querying procedures.  Part III 
addresses Fourth Amendment concerns regarding incidental collection and 
subsequent querying of U.S. persons’ information.  Part III additionally analogizes 
the constitutionality of queries conducted on section 702 information to similar 
searches done within DNA databases that are subsequently able to be used in 
unrelated criminal prosecutions.  This Note concludes by suggesting that subsequent 
 
 15 See David G. Barnum, Warrantless Electronic Surveillance in National Security Cases: 
Lessons from America, 5 EUROPEAN HUM. RTS. L. REV. 514, 514–17, 535–38 (2006).  
 16 In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 
F.3d. 1004, 1016 (FISA Ct. Rev. Aug. 22, 2008) [hereinafter In re Directives]; see United States v. 
Mohamud, 843 F.3d 420, 439 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 17 See generally Goldsmith & Hennessey, supra note 11. 
 18 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(f) (West, Westlaw through Pub L. No. 116-66). 
 19 The PCLOB is an “independent, bipartisan agency within the executive branch” that  
is vested with two fundamental authorities; (1) To review and analyze actions the 
executive branch takes to protect the nation from terrorism, ensuring the need for such 
actions is balanced with the need to protect privacy and civil liberties and (2) To ensure 
that liberty concerns are appropriately considered in the development and 
implementation of laws, regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect the nation 
against terrorism. 
PRIVACY & C.L. OVERSIGHT BD., https://www.pclob.gov (last visited Nov. 12, 2018).  The PCLOB 
was established by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, Pub. L. 110-
53, signed into law in August 2007.  Id. 
 20 See PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE 
PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
SURVEILLANCE ACT 2, 5 (2014) [hereinafter PCLOB REPORT] (explaining that its primary mission 
is to ensure that the executive branch’s efforts to protect the United States from terrorist activities 
are balanced with “the need to protect privacy and civil liberties”). 
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queries, including on incidentally collected information, are consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment.  Further, because queries are constitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment, and several procedural restrictions are in place, the FBI may use 
queried section 702 information to bring criminal charges, unrelated to national 
security, against U.S. persons. 
I.     TRADITIONAL FISA 
Enacted in 1978, FISA was aimed at curtailing abuses and delineating 
procedures to be employed by the government in conducting foreign intelligence 
surveillance.21  FISA seeks to “provide effective, reasonable safeguards to ensure 
accountability and prevent improper surveillance.”22  Title I of FISA authorizes 
electronic surveillance within the United States for foreign intelligence purposes.23  
Electronic surveillance is limited to targeting foreign powers or agents of foreign 
powers located within the United States for the purpose of collecting foreign 
intelligence information.24  In order to authorize such electronic surveillance, 
Congress created two specialized courts, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(FISC) and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR).25  The 
statute empowers the FISC to grant or deny applications for surveillance orders in 
foreign intelligence investigations.26  The FISC can authorize surveillance for 
foreign intelligence purposes if there is probable cause to believe that: (1) the target 
is a “foreign power” or an “agent of a foreign power,” and (2) each of the specific 
“facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance is directed is being used . . . 
by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”27  Further, a “significant 
purpose” of the order must be to obtain “foreign intelligence information.”28 
A.   Foreign Intelligence Information 
Foreign intelligence information is broadly defined to include two categories 
of information.  Section 1801(e)(1) authorizes the collection of 
“counterintelligence” or “protective” foreign intelligence information.29  
Counterintelligence and protective information relate to the ability of the United 
States to protect against an actual or potential attack, international terrorism, or 
clandestine intelligence activities by a foreign power or agent of a foreign power.30  
Additionally, § 1801(e)(2) authorizes collection of “positive” foreign intelligence 
 
 21 ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 793 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 22 S. Rep. No. 95-604, at 7 (1977). 
 23 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–12 (2012). 
 24 Id. § 1802(a)(1). 
 25 Id. § 1803(a). 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. § 1805(a)(2)(B). 
 28 Id. § 1804(a)(6)(B). 
 29 See id. § 1801(e)(1). 
 30 See id. § 1801(e)(1)(A)–(C). 
2020] F I S A  S E C T I O N  7 0 2  143 
information.31  Positive information refers to information relating to “national 
defense or security of the United States” or “the conduct of the foreign affairs of the 
United States.”32  Therefore, the collection of foreign intelligence information is not 
limited to preventing terrorist attacks, and, further, there is no requirement that the 
information being sought is evidence of a crime or intended for use in a criminal 
prosecution.33 
B.   Use of FISA Evidence 
So long as a significant purpose of the FISA surveillance was to gather foreign 
intelligence information, evidence of criminal activity thereby obtained may be 
introduced in subsequent criminal proceedings.34  The use of FISA information must 
also be conducted in accordance with minimization procedures.35  In the event the 
government intends to use any evidence derived from a FISA order in a criminal 
prosecution, prior notice must be provided to the “aggrieved person” against whom 
the information is to be used.36  Upon receipt of such notice, the aggrieved person 
may seek to suppress the use of FISA-derived evidence on the grounds that the 
evidence was unlawfully acquired or the government did not act in conformity with 
the relevant FISA order.37  Additionally, the aggrieved person may move to compel 
disclosure of FISA materials, including FISA applications, affidavits, court orders, 
and other documents related to the FISA surveillance.38  However, if the defendant 
moves to compel disclosure of FISA evidence, the Attorney General may oppose 
such request by filing an affidavit stating that the disclosure “would harm the 
national security of the United States.”39  If the Attorney General opposes disclosure, 
the district court then must conduct a review of the FISA warrant and application 
materials to determine whether the surveillance was “lawfully authorized and 
conducted.”40  The district court has discretion to disclose portions of the documents, 
however, to date no court has found it necessary to disclose FISA materials in order 
to make a determination of the lawfulness of a FISA warrant.41 
 
 31 See id. § 1801(e)(2). 
 32 Id. 
 33 GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 617–18 
(2017). 
 34 JAMES G. CARR & PATRICIA L. BELLIA, 2 LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 9:50, 
at 474 (2012). 
 35 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(2) (2012). 
 36 United States v. Warsame, 547 F. Supp. 2d 982, 986 (D. Minn. 2008).  Because the 
standard for a FISA order is that only a “significant purpose” of the surveillance be to obtain foreign 
intelligence, if the surveillance reveals other criminal activity unrelated to national security, the 
government will be able to pursue criminal prosecutions. 
 37 Id.; see 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f). 
 38 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id.  
 41 CORN, supra note 33, at 665. 
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II.     FISA AMENDMENTS ACT AND SECTION 702  
Following the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush authorized the NSA to 
conduct warrantless wiretapping of telephone and email communications between 
suspected terrorists abroad and Americans.42  In order to conduct warrantless 
wiretapping, one party to the communication must have been reasonably believed to 
be outside of the United States, and a participant in the communications must have 
been reasonably believed to be a member or agent of al-Qaeda or an affiliated 
terrorist organization.43  This activity was in violation of the current FISA, which 
required the government to obtain individualized orders from the FISC if it wished 
to obtain surveillance involving communications of Americans.44  However, based 
on intense public scrutiny of the Bush program, President Bush asked Congress to 
amend FISA to provide the government with authority to collect foreign intelligence 
information from non-U.S. persons located outside of the United States.45  In 2008, 
Congress enacted the FISA Amendments Act, which “supplements pre-existing 
FISA authority by creating a new framework under which the Government may seek 
the FISC’s authorization of certain foreign intelligence surveillance targeting . . . 
non-U.S. persons located abroad.”46  The 2008 FAA included a five-year sunset 
provision.  The FAA was reauthorized in 2012, and on Friday, January 19, 2018, the 
FAA was reauthorized and signed into law for an additional six years.47  
Commentators across the political spectrum have proclaimed the FAA is a “critically 
important surveillance tool—one that has helped the nation respond to (and avert) 
planned attacks.”48 
Title VII of FISA includes section 702 which authorizes the executive branch 
to acquire foreign intelligence information on non-U.S. persons reasonably believed 
to be located outside of the United States without seeking individualized FISC orders 
for each acquisition.49  The FISC thereby is permitted to issue a single order 
 
 42 Gregg, supra note 6; see also James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers 
Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/bush-
lets-us-spy-on-callers-without-courts.html. 
 43 ACLU v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 44 Goitein, supra note 5, at 550. 
 45 GEOFFREY CORN ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 219 
(2015).  In times of crises, it is exceedingly important to remember that good intentions are not the 
law. 
 46 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 568 U.S. 398, 404 (2013); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012). 
 47 Press Release, The White House, President Donald J. Trump Signs S. 139 into Law, (Jan. 
19, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-signs-s-
139-law/. 
 48 Jennifer Daskal & Stephen I. Vladeck, “Incidental” Foreign Intelligence Surveillance and 
the Fourth Amendment, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE LAW 101–02 (David 
Gray & Stephen E. Henderson eds., 2017). 
 49 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a).  “U.S. persons” is a term of art in the intelligence community 
that is defined to mean people who are American citizens and people who are permanent-resident 
aliens.  DAVID R. SHEDD ET AL., MAINTAINING AMERICA’S ABILITY TO COLLECT FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE: THE SECTION 702 PROGRAM (May 13, 2016).  The U.S. persons requirement 
establishes that neither citizens nor permanent residents of the United States can be targets of 
Section 702 surveillance.  SHEDD ET AL., supra.  As defined by Title I of FISA, a U.S. person is “a 
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approving more than one section 702 certification to acquire foreign intelligence 
information.  Prior to collecting information under section 702, the Attorney General 
and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) must submit a written certification to 
the FISC, attesting, among other factors, that targeting, minimization, and querying 
procedures are in place; have been approved by the FISC; are consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment; and that a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain 
foreign intelligence information.50  
Section 702 explicitly prohibits the intentional targeting of (1) “any person 
known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States”; (2) “a person 
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States if the purpose of such 
acquisition is to target a particular, known person reasonably believed to be in the 
United States”; (3) “a United States person reasonably believed to be located outside 
the United States”; or (4) “any communication as to which the sender and all 
intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the 
United States.”51  Further, section 702 mandates that all acquisitions comply with 
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.52  Once all procedures are satisfied, the 
FISC may authorize surveillance through issuance of an annual certification.53  The 
following Sections address the expansive procedures that must be in place prior to 
the government receiving certification from the FISC.54   
A.   Targeting and Minimization Procedures 
Prior to conducting surveillance under section 702, targeting procedures must 
be submitted to the FISC for approval.  Targeting procedures are steps the 
government must take to ensure the target of the surveillance is outside the United 
States and not a U.S. person at any time surveillance is undertaken.55  As 
demonstrated by the NSA’s targeting procedures in the 2016 certification package, 
the NSA, prior to engaging in surveillance, must “determine[] whether a person is a 
non-United States person reasonably believed to be outside the United States in light 
of the totality of the circumstances.”56 
 
citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in 
section 1101(a)(20) of [the Immigration and Nationality Act]).”  50 U.S.C. § 1801(i); see also 
OFFICE OF CIVIL LIBERTIES, PRIVACY & TRANSPARENCY, OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L 
INTELLIGENCE, STATISTICAL TRANSPARENCY REPORT: REGARDING USE OF NATIONAL 
SECURITY AUTHORITIES 6 (2019) [hereinafter TRANSPARENCY REPORT 2019], 
https://www.dni.gov/files/CLPT/documents/2019_ASTR_for_CY2018.pdf.  
 50 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(2)(A)(i), (ii), (iv), (v). 
 51 Id. § 1881a(b)(1)–(4). 
 52 Id. § 1881a(b)(5); see also TRANSPARENCY REPORT 2019, supra note 49, at 12. 
 53 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h). 
 54 Each intelligence agency sets its own targeting, minimization, and querying procedures.  
However, due to the repetitiveness, discussion concerning the NSA’s procedures is included in the 
targeting and minimization analysis.  For the querying procedures, the analysis focuses on the FBI 
as their procedures substantially vary from the other intelligence agencies. 
 55 SHEDD ET AL., supra note 49.  
 56 JEFF SESSIONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROCEDURES USED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
AGENCY FOR TARGETING NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS REASONABLY BELIEVED TO BE 
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In addition to targeting procedures, minimization procedures detail 
requirements the government must meet to use, retain, and disseminate section 702 
information.  Minimization procedures regarding section 702 information, must be 
“reasonably designed . . . to minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the 
dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting 
United States persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, 
produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information.”57  Minimization 
procedures include specific guidelines and restrictions on how the government 
handles nonpublicly available U.S.-person information acquired from section 702 
collection of non-U.S.-person targets.58 
B.   Querying Procedures 
With the reauthorization of FAA in 2017, Congress codified new querying 
procedures that must be submitted to the FISC, in addition to the targeting and 
minimization procedures, for review and approval prior to conducting surveillance.59  
Section 702 defines query as “the use of one or more terms to retrieve the 
unminimized contents or noncontents located in electronic and data storage systems 
of communications of or concerning United States persons obtained through 
acquisitions authorized under [702](a).”60 Included in the procedures adopted, the 
Attorney General and DNI must keep a record of each U.S. person query term used 
for a query.61  Query terms may be date-bound and include telephone numbers and 
email addresses, or may be as individualized as querying using an individual’s 
name.62  Each agency has a different standard for conducting and reviewing contents 
of U.S. person queries.  For example, the NSA may only query section 702 
information if the query is “reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence 
information.”63  Additionally, the NSA makes all U.S. persons’ communication 
queries and its articulated foreign intelligence purpose available to the DOJ and the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) as part of its bimonthly 
oversight reviews.64 
 
LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES TO ACQUIRE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION 
PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS 
AMENDED 1 (2017) [hereinafter NSA TARGETING PROCEDURES], 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/icotr/51117/2016_NSA_702_Targeting_Procedures_Mar_3
0_17.pdf.  
 57 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h)(1), 1821(4). 
 58 TRANSPARENCY REPORT 2019, supra note 49, at 11. 
 59 Id. at 12; see also 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(f)(1)(A) (West, Westlaw through Pub L. No. 116-
66). 
 60 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(f)(3)(B) (West, Westlaw through Pub L. No. 116-66).  
 61 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(f)(1)(B). 
 62 TRANSPARENCY REPORT 2019, supra note 49, at 12. 
 63 Id. 
 64 NSA TRAINING ON FISA AMENDMENTS, OVCS1203: FISA AMENDMENTS ACT SECTION 
702 TRAINING 54, [hereinafter NSA SECTION 702 TRAINING], 
https://www.dni.gov/files/icotr/ACLU%2016-CV-8936%20(RMB)%20001001-001049%20-
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Due to the broad power and authority the FBI has to bring unrelated criminal 
charges using information obtained under section 702, the PCLOB consistently 
pressured Congress to add additional limitations on the FBI’s section 702 querying 
procedures.65  With the reauthorization of FAA in 2017, Congress codified new 
requirements relating to the access of results of certain queries conducted by the 
FBI.66  Specifically, under section 702(f)(2)(A), an order from the FISC is now 
required prior to the FBI reviewing the contents of a query if the query (1) was not 
designed to find and extract foreign intelligence information, and (2) was performed 
in connection with a predicated criminal investigation that does not relate to national 
security.67  Each application made to the FISC further shall include the  
identity of the federal officer making the application; and an affidavit containing 
a statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant to justify 
the belief that the contents in the communications [being described] would 
provide evidence of—criminal activity; contraband, fruits of a crime, or other 
items illegally possessed by a third party; or property designed for use, intended 
for use, or used in committing a crime.68 
Following the submission of the application, the FISC enters an order 
approving the access of the contents of communications if the court finds probable 
cause to believe the contents would yield evidence of criminal activity.69  
Nevertheless, if the FBI determines there is a “reasonable belief that such contents 
could assist in mitigating or eliminating a threat to life or serious bodily harm,” a 
FISA court order is not required to access the contents of the communications, and 
the FBI can proceed immediately.70  Moreover, in general, any information 
concerning a U.S. person acquired under section 702 is not to be used in evidence 
against that U.S. person in any criminal proceeding.71  Notwithstanding, there are 
two circumstances in which evidence against a U.S. person may be used in criminal 
proceedings.  First, evidence may be used if the FBI obtained an order from FISC 
allowing access to queried information.72  Second, evidence may be used if the 
Attorney General determines either (1) the criminal proceeding affects, involves, or 
is related to national security; or (2) the criminal proceeding involves death, 
kidnapping, serious bodily injury, conduct that constitutes a criminal offense that is 
a specified offense against a minor, incapacitation or destruction of critical 
infrastructure, cybersecurity, transnational crime, or human trafficking.73 
 
%20Doc%2017.%20NSA%E2%80%99s%20Training%20on%20FISA%20Amendments%20Act
%20Section%20702.pdf. 
 65 PCLOB REPORT, supra note 20, at 11–12.  
 66 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(f)(2)(A) (West, Westlaw through Pub L. No. 116-66). 
 67 Id. 
 68 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(f)(2)(C). 
 69 Id. § 1881a(f)(2)(D). 
 70 Id. § 1881a(f)(2)(E). 
 71 Id. § 1881e(a)(2)(A). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
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III.     SECTION 702 AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Once the government has obtained approval from the FISC, the specified 
agency may proceed with its intended collection of foreign intelligence surveillance 
of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located outside of the United States.  
Such collection rarely raises constitutional concerns as the individuals targeted are 
generally not protected under the Constitution.74  However, constitutional concerns 
specifically relating to the Fourth Amendment arise when U.S. persons’ information 
is collected during this process and is subsequently retained.75  Section A of this Part 
explains the process of incidental collection and provides an analysis for why 
incidental collection is consistent with the Fourth Amendment.  Section B explains 
the process of querying—specific to the FBI—and analogizes to similar searches 
conducted on DNA databases to conclude querying is in fact consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment. 
A.   Incidental Collection 
Section 702 expressly prohibits the targeting of any U.S. person or any person 
located in the United States.76  The government is also prohibited from “reverse 
targeting”—defined as targeting a non-U.S. person outside the United States when 
the primary interest is to acquire the communications of any person in the United 
States or a U.S. person with whom the foreign target is in contact.77  However, due 
to the nature of the surveillance and collection, it is inevitable that the government 
may incidentally collect nontargeted U.S. persons’ communications.  Incidental 
collection refers to the collection of U.S. persons’ communications obtained from 
the lawful targeting of a non-U.S. person located abroad.78  For example, if a foreign 
terrorist is the target of section 702 surveillance and is communicating with a U.S. 
person or an individual located within the United States, the information relating to 
the U.S. person is considered to be incidentally collected.  Incidental collection of 
U.S. persons’ communications arises due to two techniques the government uses to 
collect foreign intelligence information.79  The two techniques are commonly 
referred to as downstream80 and upstream collection.81  Downstream collection, also 
known as PRISM, is widely known due to the efforts of Edward Snowden, and is 
 
 74 PCLOB REPORT, supra note 20, at 86. 
 75 Id. at 87. 
 76 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (2012). 
 77 NSA SECTION 702 TRAINING, supra note 64, at 24. 
 78 See Kenneth L. Wainstein & R. Brendan Mooney, Ample Safeguards of Civil Liberties 
Warrant FISA Section 702’s Reauthorization by Congress, HERITAGE FOUND. (Dec. 1, 2017). 
 79 Id. (“Incidental collection is an inevitable byproduct of any of the existing types of 
electronic communications surveillance—whether that surveillance is conducted under Section 
702, under traditional FISA, under the criminal investigative wiretap authority in 18 U.S.C. § 2518, 
or under Executive Order 12333.”). 
 80 OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, SECTION 702 OVERVIEW [hereinafter 
SECTION 702 OVERVIEW], https://www.dni.gov/files/icotr/Section702-Basics-Infographic.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
 81 SHEDD ET AL., supra note 49, at 3.  
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used by all intelligence agencies.82  PRISM functions through the cooperation of 
internet service providers (ISPs).83  Once the government has information that a 
particular individual’s name or email address is linked to foreign terrorist 
organization, the government identifies that name or email as a “selector.”84  The 
ISP is then required to relay any communications it has, either sent or received, from 
the identified selector.  All data collected is subsequently available to the 
government through PRISM.85 
By contrast, the collection technique of upstream collection does not rely on 
ISPs.  Only the NSA is permitted to conduct upstream collection, and less than ten 
percent of its collection results from this technique.86  This process functions through 
bypassing the individual ISP and focuses on compelling assistance from the 
companies that provide the telecommunications “backbone” over which these 
communications travel.87  Under upstream collection, entire streams of internet 
traffic flowing across major U.S. networks are acquired and searched, as opposed to 
PRISM collection, under which particular user accounts are monitored, and 
communications to or from those accounts are collected, including communications 
with U.S. persons.88 
Due to the nature of these programs, it is evident that they may result in the 
unintentional collection of U.S. persons’ information.  However, the FAA provides 
adequate protections for safeguarding incidentally collected information.  Prior to 
utilizing a selector, the government must apply its targeting procedures to ensure 
each identified selector is used by a non-U.S. person who is reasonably believed to 
be located outside of the United States and who likely possesses foreign intelligence 
information.89 
1.   Constitutionality of Incidental Collection 
Courts have continually held that to the extent the government incidentally 
collects communications of a U.S. person who is communicating with a section 702 
target, such “incidental collections occurring as a result of constitutionally 
permissible acquisitions do not render those acquisitions unlawful.”90 
 
 82 Timothy B. Lee, Here’s Everything We Know About PRISM to Date, WASH. POST (June 
12, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/06/12/heres-everything-we-
know-about-prism-to-date/?utm_term=.fdd10424fcc0. 
 83 See, e.g., PCLOB REPORT, supra note 20, at 7. 
 84 Id. at 6–7. 
 85 See id. 
 86 DAVID S. KRIS, HOOVER WORKING GRP. ON NAT’L SEC., TECH. & LAW, TRENDS AND 
PREDICTIONS IN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE 9 (2016), 
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/kris_trendspredictions_final_v4_digital.p
df; SECTION 702 OVERVIEW, supra note 80, at 4, https://www.dni.gov/files/icotr/Section702-
Basics-Infographic.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
 87 PCLOB REPORT, supra note 20, at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 88 See, e.g., PCLOB REPORT, supra note 20, at 7. 
 89 TRANSPARENCY REPORT 2019, supra note 49, at 17. 
 90 In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 
F.3d 1004, 1015 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008); see also United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 156–57 
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To determine whether section 702 incidental collection is compliant with the 
Fourth Amendment, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Mohamud91 analyzed (1) 
if a warrant was required for the incidental collection of U.S. persons’ 
communications, and (2) whether the process is reasonable.92  In Mohamud, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the section 702 incidental acquisition of the defendant’s email 
communications did not violate the Fourth Amendment.93  Because the government 
had lawfully targeted an overseas foreign national under section 702, the defendant’s 
email communications were thereafter incidentally collected.94  Additionally, the 
court held that no warrant was required to intercept the U.S. person’s 
communications incidentally.95 
a.   Warrant Requirement 
As a threshold matter, the court stated “the Fourth Amendment does not apply 
to searches and seizures by the United States against a non-resident alien in a foreign 
country.”96  The Ninth Circuit stressed that it is the location of the target, not where 
the collection takes place, that matters.97  Therefore, even though the collection of 
information though ISPs was done within the United States, if the target was 
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States, the Fourth Amendment 
does not apply.98  Further, the Ninth Circuit stated, “[t]he fact that the government 
knew some U.S. persons’ communications would be swept up during foreign 
intelligence gathering does not make such collection any more unlawful in this 
context than in the Title III or traditional FISA context.”99  The court found that 
because the target was a non-U.S. person outside the United States at the time of the 
surveillance, the government was not required to obtain a warrant to collect the U.S. 
person’s communications with the foreign target as an incident to its lawful search 
of the foreign target.100  The court acknowledged that because the search was exempt 
from the warrant requirement, there was no need to analyze the foreign intelligence 
exception.101 
 
(1974) (holding interception of communications of a woman that were incidentally collected 
pursuant to a criminal wiretap order targeting her husband were lawful); United States v. Bin Laden, 
126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 280 (S.D.N.Y 2000) (“[I]ncidental interception of a person’s conversations 
during an otherwise lawful surveillance is not violative of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 91 843 F.3d 420 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 92 Id. at 438–42. 
 93 Id. at 444. 
 94 Id. at 438. 
 95 Id. at 439. 
 96 Id. (quoting United States v. Zakharov, 468 F.3d 1171, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274–75 (1990). 
 97 Mohamud, 843 F.3d at 439 (citing United States v. Hasbajrami, No. 11–CR–623, 2016 
WL 1029500, at *9 n.15 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2016)).  
 98 See id. 
 99 Id. at 440. 
 100 Id. at 441. 
 101 Id. at 441 n.25. 
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b.   Reasonableness Requirement 
In deciding reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, courts generally 
examine the totality of the circumstances and weigh “‘the promotion of legitimate 
governmental interests’ against ‘the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an 
individual’s privacy.’”102  In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,103 the Court 
stated, “the Government’s interest in combating terrorism is an urgent objective of 
the highest order.”104  In reviewing the government’s interest, the court in Mohamud 
found that the government’s sole interest was in protecting the United States from a 
terrorist threat.105  In weighing the U.S. person’s privacy interests whose 
communications have been incidentally collected, the court looks both at the 
reasonableness of individuals expectation of privacy and the government’s 
minimization and targeting procedures.106  The court in Mohamud relied on the third-
party doctrine to demonstrate that the U.S. person had a diminished expectation of 
privacy when he assumed the risk to communicate with non-U.S. persons outside 
the United States.107  The court then assessed the reasonableness of the inquiry based 
on whether the FISC-approved targeting and minimization measures sufficiently 
protected the privacy interests of the U.S. persons.108  The court in Mohamud held 
government’s minimization and targeting procedures sufficiently protected the U.S. 
person’s privacy interests.109  Therefore, the court held that even assuming the U.S. 
person is protected by a warrant requirement (which the court held U.S. person’s 
incidental collection is not) that the search would still be reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.110  As demonstrated by the court in Mohamud, information obtained 
through the lawful targeting of a non-U.S. person located abroad remains a 
constitutional acquisition whether or not the information collected is considered 
incidental. 
 
 102 Maryland v. King 569 U.S. 435, 448 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Wyoming v. 
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).  
 103  561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
 104 Id. at 28. 
 105 See Mohamud, 843 F.3d at 441. 
 106 See id. at 442–43. 
 107 Id. at 442; see also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“[T]he Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed 
by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will 
be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be 
betrayed.”). 
 108 Mohamud, 843 F.3d at 443. 
 109 Id.  The court found the targeting procedures were reasonably designed to ensure the 
acquisition was limited to targeting persons reasonably located outside the United States and the 
minimization procedures were also reasonably designed to minimize the acquisition and retention 
of nonpublicly available information concerning U.S. persons.  Id. at 443–44. 
 110 See id. at 444. 
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B.   Queries 
After finding that incidental collection is constitutional, there is a separate 
question of whether it is constitutional for intelligence agencies—particularly the 
FBI—to conduct subsequent warrantless queries on the collected communications 
to search the phone calls or emails of particular Americans, a practice known as 
“backdoor searches.”111  Following lawful acquisition of communications and 
information of non-U.S. persons located abroad, the government may conduct 
additional queries on section 702 collected information, including incidentally 
collected information.112  Judge Hogan in a 2015 FISC opinion stated:  
Nothing in the statute precludes the examination of information that has 
otherwise been properly acquired through application of the targeting procedures 
and retained under the minimization procedures for the purpose of finding 
evidence of crimes, whether or not those crimes relate to foreign intelligence.113 
Further, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence stated: 
When NSA looks into its own database using U.S. person information, it is not a 
Fourth Amendment “search.”  NSA is not collecting any new information.  
Rather, NSA is simply looking through the database of foreign communications 
it already has.114 
The NSA, FBI, and CIA’s minimization procedures permit appropriately-
trained personnel with access to section 702-acquired information to conduct 
 
 111 Elizabeth Goitein, Americans’ Privacy at Stake as Second Circuit Hears Hasbajrami FISA 
Case, JUST SECURITY, (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/60439/americans-privacy-
stake-circuit-hears-hasbajrami-fisa-case/. 
 112 Section 702: Backdoor Search Loophole, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Mar. 15, 2017) 
[hereinafter Section 702: Backdoor Search], https://cdt.org/files/2017/06/2017-06-22-702-
Backdoor-Search-One-pager.pdf.  In this instance, 
[t]o “query” means to take a term, such as a name, phone number or email address, and 
use it to isolate communications with that term from a larger pool of data that an agency 
has already lawfully collected.  Queries do not result in the additional collection of any 
information.  Rather, they allow an agency to rapidly and efficiently locate foreign 
intelligence information, such as information potentially related to a terrorism plot 
against the United States, without having to sift through each and every communication 
that has been collected. 
Letter from Dierdre M. Walsh, Dir. of Legislative Affairs, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, 
to Ron Wyden, U.S. Senator (June 27, 2014).  
 113 Memorandum Opinion & Order at 33, [Redacted], No. [Redacted], (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 
2015) [hereinafter 2015 Memorandum Opinion], https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/20151106-
702Mem_Opinion_Order_for_Public_Release.pdf; see also Cody M. Poplin, ONDI Releases 
Three FISC Opinions, LAWFARE (Apr. 20, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/odni-releases-
three-fisc-opinions. 
 114 H.R. PERMANENT SELECT COMM. OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, FISA SECTION 702 
DEBATE 2, https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/updated_usp_fact_check.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2018).  The House Committee analogizes by stating, “This act is like police officers 
looking through an evidence locker to see if evidence from past crimes might help solve an open 
case.  The police do not violate anyone’s constitutional rights because they are simply reviewing 
evidence already in their possession lawfully, not carrying out a search.”  Id. 
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queries.115  Queries are conducted by using an identifier, such as a phone number or 
email, to search through data that has already been acquired through section 702 
collection.116  However, as alluded to by Judge Hogan, information on U.S. persons’ 
communications obtained through this additional warrantless query can be used to 
prosecute Americans for crimes unrelated to terrorism.117  These additional queries, 
it is argued, are in direct violation of the Fourth Amendment as information 
pertaining to U.S. persons is obtained without a warrant and may be used to 
investigate and prosecute Americans for crimes unrelated to terrorism.118 
In response to many concerns outlined in the PCLOB report, in 2018, Congress 
codified new requirements regarding access of U.S. person queries to the FBI.119  
Queries by FBI personnel of section 702 acquired data must be reasonably designed 
to “find and extract” either (1) foreign intelligence information, or (2) evidence of a 
crime.120  Further, an order from the FISC is now required prior to the FBI reviewing 
contents of certain U.S.-person queries.121  Specifically, a FISC order is required 
when the query is not designed to find and extract foreign intelligence information, 
and instead is performed in connection with a predicated criminal investigation not 
relating to national security.122  Prior to issuance of an order based on probable cause 
from the FISC, a FBI agent must apply in writing and include justification that the 
query would provide evidence of criminal activity, which is to be approved by the 
Attorney General.123  Enacted in 2015, the USA FREEDOM Act, instilled an 
additional requirement mandating public reporting of statistics regarding the number 
of U.S. person identifiers queried on section 702 information.124  In 2018, the 
estimated number of search terms used in querying section 702 obtained 
communications of U.S. persons was 9637.125  While the number of U.S. person 
query terms used to query section 702 content has risen consistently over the past 
three years, the FBI reported zero instances where FBI personnel reviewed section 
702 information based on a query to return evidence of a crime unrelated to foreign 
intelligence.126 
Additionally, information acquired under a section 702 query may not be 
introduced as evidence against that person in any criminal proceedings except with 
 
 115 See PCLOB REPORT, supra note 20, at 55. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Section 702: Backdoor Search, supra note 112. 
 118 See id. 
 119 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(f) (West, Westlaw through Pub L. No. 116-66); see also PCLOB 
REPORT, supra note 20, at 97 (calling for additional limits on the FBI’s use and dissemination of 
section 702 data in connection with criminal investigations unrelated to foreign intelligence 
matters); see also Rachel Levinson-Waldman, NSA Surveillance in the War on Terror, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE LAW 7, 36 (David Gray & Stephen E. Henderson eds., 
2017). 
 120 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(f)(2)(A). 
 121 TRANSPARENCY REPORT 2019, supra note 49, at 14 n.1. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at 13. 
 125 Id. at 14. 
 126 Id. at 16. 
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the approval of the Attorney General, and in criminal cases with national security 
implications or certain other serious crimes.127  The 2017 FAA amendments 
additionally require the FBI to report on the number of instances in which they 
opened a criminal investigation of a U.S. person, who is not considered a threat to 
national security, based wholly or in part on section 702 acquired information.128  As 
reported in the DNI Transparency Report, in 2017 and subsequently in 2018, there 
were zero instances in which the FBI opened a criminal investigation of a U.S. 
person who was not considered a threat to national security, based wholly or in part 
on section 702-acquired information.129  
In 2015, the FISC held that the FBI’s U.S.-person querying provisions within 
its minimization procedures, “strike a reasonable balance between the privacy 
interests of the United States person and persons in the United States, on the one 
hand, and the government’s national security interests, on the other.”130  The 2015 
FISC order also requires the government to report in writing, “each instance after 
December 4, 2015, in which FBI personnel receive and review section 702-acquired 
information that the FBI identifies as concerning a United States person in response 
to a query that is not designed to find and extract foreign intelligence 
information.”131  The new procedural requirements determine that the FBI is not 
permitted to engage in backdoor or pretextual searches of U.S. persons’ incidentally 
collected information.  Likewise, the data revealed in the DNI Transparency Report 
further demonstrates the FBI’s compliance. 
1.   Constitutionality of Queries 
Querying databases containing section 702 information does not result in any 
new acquisition of data; it is instead only an examination or reexamination of 
previously acquired information.132  Therefore, queries are not separate searches for 
Fourth Amendment purposes.133   
In similar database collections, such as DNA databases, courts have held that 
subsequent analyses of information previously collected do not rise to the level of a 
search under the Fourth Amendment, and thus can be used in unrelated criminal 
 
 127 2015 Memorandum Opinion, supra note113, at 30 n.28.  
 128 50 U.S.C.A. § 1873(b)(2)(D) (West, Westlaw through Pub L. No. 116-66). 
 129 OFFICE OF CIVIL LIBERTIES, PRIVACY & TRANSPARENCY, OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L 
INTELLIGENCE, STATISTICAL TRANSPARENCY REPORT: REGARDING USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
AUTHORITIES 6 (Apr. 2018), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/icotr/2018-ASTR----CY2017--
--FINAL-for-Release-5.4.18.pdf; see also TRANSPARENCY REPORT 2019, supra note 49, at 16. 
 130 2015 Memorandum Opinion, supra note 113, at 44. 
 131 TRANSPARENCY REPORT 2019, supra note 49, at 16 (emphasis omitted). 
 132 SHEDD ET AL., supra note 49, at 6; Christopher Wray, Dir., FBI, Defending the Value of 
the FISA Section 702 at The Heritage Foundation (Oct. 13, 2017), 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/defending-the-value-of-fisa-section-702. 
 133 Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, The FISA Amendments Act: Q&A  
(Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.dni.gov/files/icotr/FISA%20Amendments%20Act%20QA%20for 
%20Publication.pdf. 
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prosecutions.134  For example, in Maryland v. King, the defendant was arrested and 
charged with first and second degree assault for “menacing a group of people with 
a shotgun.”135  As part of Maryland’s routine booking procedures—pursuant to the 
Maryland DNA Collection Act—a DNA sample was collected from the 
defendant.136  The DNA was uploaded to the Maryland DNA database and three 
weeks later was identified as a match for an unsolved rape case.137  The DNA match 
resulted partly through the use of the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), which 
connects DNA laboratories at the local, state, and national level.138  The defendant 
was indicted and charged with the rape.139  The defense sought to suppress the DNA 
match evidence on the grounds that the subsequent analysis of DNA in the Maryland 
DNA database violated the Fourth Amendment.140  However, this argument was 
rejected and the defendant pleaded not guilty to the rape charges and was convicted 
and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.141  Specific to the 
Maryland DNA Collection Act authorizing the initial intake of DNA, the Court 
reasoned that because the Act provided sufficient procedural protections142 against 
further invasions of privacy, the initial collection and subsequent analysis was 
safeguarded from unconstitutional invasions of privacy.143  Additionally, in 
weighing the interests of the parties, the Court reasoned that law enforcement’s 
interest in being informed of potential dangers the arrestee posed to the public 
outweighed an arrested individual’s diminished expectations of privacy.144  The 
Court ultimately held that because the defendant’s DNA was lawfully collected as 
part of routine booking procedure authorized by the Maryland DNA Collection Act, 
the subsequent analysis of the DNA, pursuant to procedures authorized by Congress 
in CODIS, did not amount to a significant invasion of privacy that would render the 
DNA identification impermissible under the Fourth Amendment.145 
 
 134 Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465 (2013); see also Scott L. Miley, DNA Samples Linked 
to Unsolved Crimes, TRIBSTAR (Apr. 17, 2017), https://www.tribstar.com/news/local_news/dna-
samples-linked-to-unsolved-crimes/article_60ea852c-cb1c-5c91-89ff-426fda183caf.html 
(discussing forty-six matches to unsolved crimes from 3350 DNA samples taken over a three-
month period after implementing enacting legislating for use of CODIS).  
 135 King, 569 U.S. at 440. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. at 444–45.  CODIS was authorized by Congress in 1994 and is supervised by the FBI.  
CODIS sets uniform national standards for DNA matching and facilitates connections between 
local law enforcement agencies.  Id. 
 139 Id. at 441. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Procedural protections included how the DNA was to be collected and stored as well as 
how and when DNA samples were to be tested.  Id. at 443–44. 
 143 Id. at 463–65. 
 144 Id. at 437. 
 145 Id. at 465; see also Boroian v. Mueller 616 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2010) (“[T]he “FBI’s 
retention and periodic matching of the profile against other profiles . . . for the purpose of 
identification is not an intrusion on the offender’s legitimate expectation of privacy and thus does 
not constitute a separate Fourth Amendment search.”); Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 498 
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The same reasoning applies to section 702 queries with equal force.  Similar 
to the Maryland DNA Collection Act, section 702 authorizes the collection of 
information; specifically, foreign intelligence information on non-U.S. persons 
located abroad.146  As analyzed in Part III, information incidentally collected 
regarding U.S. persons is deemed constitutional and within the scope of section 
702.147  Once intelligence agencies have collected the information, it is held within 
databases.148  Similar to how the DNA was analyzed through the Maryland DNA 
database and CODIS, queries are run through the previously acquired section 702 
data and do not result in obtaining new or additional information.  Therefore, if the 
FBI conducts a query and the results connect an individual to separate, unrelated 
criminal activity, similar to how the subsequent unrelated charge was brought in 
King, the FBI holds the requisite authority to make an arrest on the newly identified 
criminal activity.  Additionally, the Court in King stressed the importance of the 
procedural protections the Maryland DNA Collection Act offered.149  Section 702 
has vast procedural protections at the outset of collecting foreign intelligence, 
including both the required targeting and minimization procedures.  Section 702, 
however, provides even further procedural protections for the information once it is 
obtained and subsequently queried, including the querying procedures and rigorous 
oversight.150  For instance, prior to the FBI reviewing contents of U.S. person queries 
unrelated to national security, the agents must receive explicit approval from the 
FISC.151  Similar to the scope of DNA searches, queries are limited to information 
that has previously been collected under section 702 surveillance; therefore, the 
breadth of content is unlikely to be immensely personal. 
In weighing the interests of the parties, here the U.S. person whose information 
was acquired incidentally may not have received notice of such acquisition, but 
viewed in a light similar to the third-party doctrine, because the U.S. person assumed 
the risk by communicating with a foreign national likely to be targeted under section 
702, the U.S. person’s expectation of privacy is diminished.  Whereas, the 
government continues to have a heightened interest in pursuing queries to detect and 
prevent national security threats.  Further, implementing a requirement that the 
government must obtain a warrant before using a U.S. person identifier to query 
section 702 would severely hamper the speed and efficiency of operations by 
creating an unnecessary barrier to national security professionals’ ability to identify 
 
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (“[A]ccessing the records stored in the [DNA] database is not a ‘search’ for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.”). 
 146 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a (West, Westlaw through Pub L. No. 116-66). 
 147 See supra Section III.A.  
 148 See TRANSPARENCY REPORT 2019, supra note 49, at 31.  
 149 King, 569 U.S. at 465. 
 150 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(f); see also Wainstein & Mooney, supra note 78 (discussing 
Executive, Congressional, and Judicial oversight of Section 702); Wray, supra note 132. 
 151 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(f)(2)(A).  This additional layer of protection provides substantially 
more oversight and protection of individual liberty and privacy than exists in the context of the 
DNA databases, thus further strengthening the claim that subsequent queries are not searches 
subject to the Fourth Amendment. 
2020] F I S A  S E C T I O N  7 0 2  157 
potential threat information already in the lawful possession of the intelligence 
community.152 
It is clear that the Court’s decision and reasoning in King is directly applicable 
to the question of queries conducted on section 702 information.  Therefore, because 
collection of information is lawfully obtained under section 702, and the statute 
provides narrow and precise procedural protections, the subsequent querying and 
unrelated charges brought do not amount to additional searches or significant 
invasions of privacy under which the Fourth Amendment would be implicated.153 
CONCLUSION 
FISA—and in particular section 702—remain vital and fundamental resources 
necessary for protecting national security.  Yet, protecting national security should 
never come at the expense of impinging individual privacies and liberties.  It is 
inevitable that the government will continue to be faced with challenges in reaching 
an appropriate balance of protecting national security while safeguarding individual 
liberties.  However, section 702, specifically the process of querying, should perhaps 
be an example to Congress for the extent of procedural protections that must be in 
place for surveillance and subsequent searches to be consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment.  The updated querying protections in the 2017 amendments provide 
sufficient limitations on queries in order to protect U.S. persons’ incidentally 
collected information.  Section 702 collection and subsequent queries provide the 
appropriate resources for intelligence agencies to conduct surveillance to protect 
national security while protecting U.S. persons’ information that may be incidentally 
collected and subsequently queried. 
 
 152 OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, THE FISA AMENDMENTS ACT: Q&A 9 
(2017).  
 153 This conclusion mirrors that of Judge Hogan, who in the 2015 FISC opinion stated that 
“[n]othing in the statute precludes the examination of information that has otherwise been properly 
acquired through application of the targeting procedures and retained under the minimization 
procedures for the purpose of finding evidence of crimes, whether or not those crimes relate to 
foreign intelligence.”  See 2015 Memorandum Opinion, supra note 113, at 33. 
